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ABSTRACT 
Safety cases are the development foundation for safety-critical 
systems and are often quite complex to understand depending on 
the size of the system and operational conditions. The recent advent 
of security aspects complicates the issues further. This paper 
describes an approach to analysing safety and security in a 
structured way and creating security-informed safety cases that 
provide justification of safety taking into particular consideration 
the impact of security. The paper includes an overview of the 
structured assurance case concept, a security-informed safety 
methodology and a layered approach to constructing cases. The 
approach is applied to a Security Gateway that is used to control 
data flow between security domains in a separation kernel based 
operating system in avionics environment. We show that a clear 
and structured way of presenting a safety case combining safety and 
security alleviates understanding important interactions taking into 
account the impact and, hence, increases safety. 
General Terms 
Design, Security, Theory. 
Keywords 
Security-informed safety case, MILS, security gateway, layers of 
assurance. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally, safety and security have been treated as separate 
disciplines for high assurance Cyber-Physical Systems. This 
position is becoming untenable as there is a growing realization that 
security and safety are closely interconnected especially with the 
increasing openness of systems. Both security and safety can be 
viewed as aspects of dependability in the sense that each is 
concerned with mitigating the effects of a particular kind of failure. 
Both disciplines use similar techniques to identify potential failure 
modes or attack vectors and assess their impact on the overall 
system. Thus, there is considerable overlap between safety and 
security, and it is often important to address them together. 
A detailed safety analysis and the production of a safety case are 
now required by various standards in automotive [1], railway [2], 
nuclear [3] and other industries. In this paper we are focusing on 
the avionics domain, but leverage the formality of safety cases of 
other domains. Aviation has been implementing systems by 
following the safety standards [4] [5] and recently by using the 
safety-driven design-approach of Integrated Modular Avionics 
(IMA) [6]. IMA relies on the concept of partitioning between 
applications. Similarly, avionic industry has recently issued 
security standard [7] [8]. In terms of the system design, the security-
driven design approach of Multiple Independent Level of Security 
(MILS) is used with partitioning and a separation kernel to control 
information flow [9]. Building on the safety case approach and 
taking into account security considerations, we are interested in 
developing an integrated security and safety solution that can be 
applied to the avionics use case to create a good and convincing 
security-informed safety case. As a use case, a MILS-based 
gateway controlling information flow between aircraft security 
domains, is presented and analysed. 
The paper is structured in the following way. The overall approach 
that we are developing is described in Section 2. An overview of 
the case study and the application of the approach are discussed in 
Section 3. Conclusions and next steps are outlined in Section 4. 
2. SECURITY-INFORMED SAFETY 
CASE 
2.1. General Concept 
The approach we are developing is based on the use of structured 
assurance cases for communicating and building confidence in the 
safety and security properties of the system.  Structured assurance 
cases are used in a wide range of industrial domains. Our current 
practice is based on a concept of Claims, Arguments and Evidence 
(CAE), which can be related to the approach developed by Toulmin 
[10]. CAE supports the description of how sophisticated 
engineering arguments are actually made. The key elements of 
CAE are briefly described in Section 6.1 and also [11]. 
Security considerations have a significant impact on various 
aspects of safety justification. It is necessary to make claims about 
security properties as well as safety properties, to demonstrate 
compliance with both security and safety standards, and to consider 
a broader set of potential hazards, threats and vulnerabilities. 
Our experience and previous research [12] has shown that a 
significant portion of a security-informed safety case will need to 
address security explicitly. In some instances this will lead to 
substantial changes to the system design, the implementation 
process and the justification. For example, the following areas are 
particularly significant from a security perspective and need more 
scrutiny in a security-informed safety case: 
• Supply chain integrity 
• Confidentiality of the process and product 
• Combination of specific aspects of addressing safety and 
security design approaches and life cycle processes of 
certification and updates, such as stable and infrequently 
changing system design and certification approaches 
addressing safety combined with requirement of frequent 
security subsystem updates. 
  
• Issues of lifecycle threats and malicious threats to evidence, 
e.g.: 
 Malicious events after system deployment that will 
change in nature and scope as the threat 
environment changes 
 Weakening of security controls as the capability of 
the attacker and technology changes. This may have 
major impact on proposed lifetime of installed 
equipment and design for refurbishment and change 
• Design changes to address new user interactions, training, 
configuration, and vulnerabilities. This might lead to 
additional functional requirements that implement security 
controls. 
• Possible exploitation of the device/service to attack itself or 
others. 
In order to address these additional security risks within a case, it 
is necessary to combine safety and security risk assessment. 
Because many systems already have safety justifications with 
corresponding risk assessments we are developing an adapted 
process to make them security-informed. Thus, our approach is 
different from other work in avionics, for example, where the idea 
is to develop an integrated approach from scratch. Furthermore, the 
presented approach brings the formality of safety case perspective 
into avionics, where the term safety case is not common at the 
moment. 
2.2. Security-Informed Safety Case 
Architecture 
The justification of a security-informed safety case can be complex, 
or at least complicated, as it combines the claims from adaptation, 
supply chain and deployment, implementation details and hazard 
and vulnerability analysis. As one role of the case is to 
communicate effectively, one needs to balance both the risk of 
abstracting away important details and the risk of the important 
details being lost in a sea of other details.  
The works of Rushby and Delong [13] [14] raise the idea of 
compositionality and layered assurance. The goals of the approach 
are manifest in the LAW series of workshop [15]. These explore 
the “bold proposition that it is possible to build assured systems 
from compositions of previously assured components, while being 
able to derive the system level properties (e.g., safety & security) 
systematically from the properties of the components.  LAW spans 
the theoretical, engineering, and certification challenges to be met 
in making compositional assurance for such systems a reality. They 
use the term "layered" assurance to encompass diverse 
manifestations of combined assurance, including composition (of 
assured components), incremental certification (incremental cost 
for incremental change), abstraction layers (building upon 
assurance of lower layers), and polymorphism (common assurance 
of variants, such as among members of a product family). MILS is 
one approach to achieving the goals of compositional assurance. 
Abstraction is one of the key structuring mechanisms and we have 
experimented with various levels of abstraction when creating 
security-informed safety cases. We call those levels layers of 
assurance, because within each abstraction level the assurance is 
provided. We identified the following main layers of assurance: 
• L0 Policy and requirements – the highest level of abstraction 
where the system represents its requirements, and defines 
safety and security policies and their interaction; 
• L1 Architectural layer – the intermediate level where the 
abstract system components and architecture are analysed; 
• L2 Implementation layer – the detailed level where the 
implementation of specific components and their integration 
within the specific system architecture are scrutinised. 
These layers of assurance fit well the layered system design 
approach of aerospace described in ARP 4754 [6] combined with 
the compositional approach of MILS [10] and IMA [16].  
Our approach supports the goals of layered and compositional 
assurance. Additionally, it also shows where the ambition needs to 
be modified. We take into account the diversity of properties. 
Exemplarily, properties can be:  
• properties of the system not the components 
• of wider scope at the architectural level (i.e. they can inform 
the L0 level but the overall assurance may need additional 
considerations) 
• derived properties that are identified only when the 
implementation details are defined and analysed (e.g. related 
to derived hazards, and so forth.  
The following chapter instantiates and discusses each abstraction 
layer in application to the MILS gateway use case, a potential 
subsystem in future aircraft system architectures. 
3. ANALYSIS OF SECURITY 
GATEWAY 
3.1. Overview of the Gateway Use Case 
As use case for our study we use a gateway function. Usually 
security gateways connect two or more security domains [17] to 
each other and control the information flow according to a given 
information flow policy. Our gateway is implemented by using the 
design concept of Multiple Independent Layers of Security (MILS). 
MILS bases on the properties of separation and controlled 
information flow. In current MILS proposals these two properties 
are achieved by a special operation system layers. This operating 
system provides separation by the concept of partitioning. 
Partitions are isolated runtime environments for applications. Since 
a meaningful MILS system only works with allowed interactions 
among application, the operating system also allows a controlled 
information flow between partitions. Applications can implement 
further layers of security, e.g. cryptographic algorithms or more 
sophisticated data processing, or entire other function such as 
image processing. 
The gateway is intended to filter application-level data traffic for 
the TFTP and HTTP protocol. It achieves its data filtering by a 
cooperating of several partition applications allowing to interact in 
a certain way with each other.  Figure 1 shows the abstract system 
design [18]. Each solid box represents one partition provided by the 
operating system. In the use case implementation we use PikeOS 
[19]. The arrows define the directed and controlled information 
flow among partition in order to allow interaction. Using the MILS 
architecture allows the definition and implementation of a local 
security and information flow policy for each partition. For 
example, each Receiver Component is in charge to analyse ingress 
traffic and forward it either to the TFTP or to the HTTP filter chain. 
Each filter chain’s policy again is to filter these data packets 
according to the prevalent application-level protocol. 
  
The security policy of the Audit partition is to gather audit records 
generated by other partitions and to store them securely in order to 
provide traceability. 
3.2. Application of the Layered Assurance 
Approach 
3.2.1. Scope of the System 
The scope of the security and safety analysis, of our use case is 
broader than just the gateway. We are interested in a system 
consisting of applications in two domains having different security 
levels. Each application belongs to a single security domain and can 
only communicate with applications from the other security domain 
via the security gateway.  
Figure 2 shows a context data flow diagram representing the high 
view of such broader system. The double circle at the centre 
represents the gateway process that performs various operations 
(receives data streams, applies security policies, transmits the 
filtered content etc.). Rectangles identify external entities that 
interact with the gateway. They comprise applications from two 
domains (A and B) and the administrators that can maintain the 
gateway while being in maintenance mode (a special operational 
mode). An open-ended rectangle indicates a data store where the 
logging and alerting data are stored by the gateway for later use. 
3.2.2. Discussion of L0 and the Case Study 
The first and most abstract level concerns requirements, policies 
and principles of the system, with the focus on the system safety, 
system security and their interaction. 
The top-level claim involves introducing a security policy, 
considering a set of applications at different security classification, 
and safety criticalities associated with them. At L0 the abstract 
gateway enforces a security policy that puts constraints on inter-
domain information flows. We need to undertake an analysis to 
show that the interaction and trade-offs are satisfactory. It is 
unlikely that under all runtime circumstances one simple and static 
policy will be valid. There will be times of initialisation, special 
operational modes or changing threat levels that will impact the 
policy. For example at high levels of security threat the system 
might be adjusted to isolate high-safety applications from all 
applications of other domains. Alternatively, in times of 
operationally challenging conditions safety consideration could 
require an adaption of the security policies in order to allow 
manually transmitted messages by trusted external entities to 
provide guidance and recovery strategies to the pilots.  
 
Figure 2: The high-level data flow diagram of the system 
Figure 3 provides an illustration of some of these considerations by 
showing different policy zones. At the bottom left we have an area 
of maximum operational benefit. The other areas indicate how 
certain threat level security concerns dominating e.g. the need to 
restrict the flows. In this case the safety analysis must show that 
these are acceptably safe even if they do cause higher workload or 
operational complexities. There is a corresponding zone where 
safety issues dominate and the security policy is the same or 
weakened. In this case, the security analysis must show that 
identified security threats are countered by other environmental 
properties during this time.  
 
Figure 3: Defining integrated policy 
 
Figure 1: High-level View of Gateway Components 
  
Finally, the top right hand corner is a very uncertain and 
undecidable area where some special capabilities might be needed, 
e.g. in the form of a manual override to security policy enabling 
flows as well as a manual closing down on all non-essential 
information flows if threats were high and compromise was likely. 
Again, the consequences of any trade-offs need to be assessed 
during the analysis.In summary as we create the L0 case for the 
system we need to address the: 
• modes of safety application 
• operational modes of the gateway 
• impact of different threat levels 
• attributes for the gateway’s policy 
At this level we develop a substance to the analysis of the policy 
interactions, we have an updated security policy and safety 
requirements as well as initial results from the risk analysis. Also, 
we identify some more details about modes of operation of the 
gateway and the overall system as well as availability and other 
attributes for the properties. 
3.2.3. Discussion of L1 and the Case Study 
At this level we analyse the components and the architecture of the 
system, which play important roles in achieving system objectives 
and enforcing the critical properties of the system. To address 
security considerations, we applied various methods of security 
analysis including: 
• A guideword-based approach derived from the safety HAZOP 
analysis; 
• An analysis of trust relationships; 
• STRIDE, the Microsoft threat modelling approach. 
The analysis conducted showed that many parts of the critical 
properties of the system are enforced by the separation kernel. 
Other important components of the architecture include the 
gateway application software, system monitor & audit component, 
system integrator, etc. 
The resulting L1 level case considers many of the critical 
properties, related to the system functionality as well as other 
aspects (reliability, availability, etc.) and properties identified at 
L0.  Each of the architectural components enforcing the critical 
properties of the system should be expanded further to demonstrate 
that the implemented subcomponents really enforce the 
corresponding properties. This type of analysis is to be performed 
at the next L2 level of abstraction. 
3.2.4. Discussion of L2 and the Case Study 
L2 represents the detailed implementation level. At this level we 
introduce all the technical information available about the actual 
system implementation. 
To illustrate the approach let us consider one of the critical 
properties of the system identified at L0: “All communication 
between domains of different security levels must be controlled in 
accordance with a system-wide security policy”. At the L1 level this 
is expanded into subclaims related to system components and 
architecture. One of such subclaims defined at L1 is: “All 
communication between domains of different security levels must 
go through the security gateway”. The L1 analysis also shows that 
this subclaim is enforced by the defined information flow between 
partitions configured and assured by the PikeOS component within 
the system architecture. Therefore, the implementation details of 
both the gateway and the PikeOS need to be thoroughly analysed 
in order to demonstrate that the critical property is really enforced. 
This analysis is performed at the L2 level of abstraction. 
In terms of implementation, the security gateway is composed out 
of user applications hosted by PikeOS. The gateway’s purpose is to 
control all information flow between applications located in 
different security domains according to the system-wide policy. All 
applications are supposed to communicate in accordance to the 
settings specified in the PikeOS system configuration file (VMIT 
file). This file is configured in an XML format by the system 
integrator and converted into a binary form. Then all software 
application binaries (with binaries of the security gateway 
component being part of them), PikeOS binary objects 
(microkernel, platform support package, PikeOS system software) 
and the PikeOS system configuration file are assembled into one 
binary file - PikeOS ROM image, which is then booted and run on 
the target system [20]. 
Therefore, the case created at this level of abstraction may include 
(but is not limited to) the following claims: 
1) Gateway is implemented and deployed as a user 
applications within PikeOS partitions; 
2) Inter-partition channels in the VMIT file are configured 
in a way that all partitions with different security settings 
can only communicate with the gateway partitions 
(inbound or outbound); 
3) There are no errors in the configuration file allowing 
partitions with different security settings to communicate 
bypassing the gateway partitions; 
4) Partitions can only communicate by using the 
communication channels provided by PikeOS (e.g. via 
shared memory resources, network resource, etc.) 
5) All PikeOS binary objects, configuration binary, gateway 
application binary and the resulting ROM binary image 
are generated properly without any malicious 
modifications or corruptions; 
6) The binary objects are not modified or replaced after they 
have been generated. 
7) All partitions are initialized, created and set up correctly 
before data passes the gateway; 
8) Gateway application is loaded properly after the 
separation kernel has been established, and is available to 
use; 
9) Gateway application can receive and send messages to 
the gateway partitions’ ports, which are the end points for 
the communication channels configured in the VMIT 
file; 
10) PikeOS security kernel correctly enforces any settings 
specified in the VMIT configuration file. 
Some of the above details (e.g. points #4, 6, 7, 10) are related to the 
general PikeOS implementation and can be satisfied by showing 
that the PikeOS is implemented correctly to its specification 
providing all the required functionality. Other claims are dependent 
on the correct implementation of the gateway application (#1, 9), 
experience of the system integrator (#2, 3), trusted development 
and deployment processes (#5, 6). 
  
As a result, we developed CAE structures for each of the levels 
when analysing the gateway. There are two main roles of the 
approach: 1) it aids in the communication by providing a summary 
of the issues and their interrelationship and 2) it indicates how we 
might reason that the lower properties combine to satisfy the top-
level claim. To show that the claims are a complete set and that the 
PikeOS and Security Gateway properties do in fact combine in this 
way will require us to provide a more formal semantics. One way 
to do this is to take a more explicit model based approach where the 
claim structure helps us identify the right level of abstraction and 
detail in the model. This is a topic for future research. 
4. CONCLUSION 
This paper presents the approach to creating security-informed 
safety cases and its application to a MILS-based security gateway. 
We have developed a Layered Assurance approach and provided 
some findings from the case study. 
We found that the Layered CAE Assurance Case has broadened our 
view of how to combine safety and security. For example since 
tackling at architecture level is insufficient, we need to escalate to 
requirements using the abstraction layers and the explicit 
consideration of policy interactions within the L0 layer. In addition 
the consideration of lifecycle issues, particularly the adaptation and 
updating of the system that is part of our assurance case approach. 
The CAE Layered Approach provides a generic link between a 
number of key processes: the integrated risk analysis and the safety 
and security system development lifecycle, and further integration 
could be developed. 
We also found that the IMA architecture and PikeOS have intrinsic 
properties of separation and partitioning that are fundamental to 
enforcing the safety and security properties. While many of the 
assurance required from a security-informed safety perspective will 
exist in the IMA assurance, the emphasis on the credibility of the 
supply chain, the trust in tools, the response to malicious events, 
maintenance and update policies will be different. 
The next steps will be taken towards additional formalisation of the 
reasoning within the security-informed safety cases and linking 
them to formal models. Additionally, issues related to 
compositionality and traceability between layers would need to be 
addressed in more detail. 
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6. APPENDIX 
6.1. Assurance Case Overview 
Structured assurance cases are used in a wide range of industrial 
domains. Current practice is based on a concept of claims, 
arguments and evidence (CAE), which can be traced back to the 
approach developed by Toulmin [10]. CAE supports the 
description of how sophisticated engineering arguments are 
actually made. The key elements are: 
• Claims, which are assertions put forward for general 
acceptance. They are typically statements about a property of 
the system or some subsystem. Claims that are asserted as true 
without justification become assumptions and claims 
supporting an argument are called sub-claims. 
• Evidence that is used as the basis of the justification of the 
claim. This is information accepted as an established fact. 
Sources of evidence may include the design, the development 
process, prior field experience, testing (including statistical 
testing), source code analysis or formal analysis. 
• Arguments link the evidence to the claim. They are the 
“statements indicating the general ways of arguing being 
applied in a particular case and implicitly relied on and whose 
trustworthiness is well established” [10] together with the 
validation for the scientific and engineering laws used. 
The basic elements of a justification represented in a graphical 
ASCAD notation [11] shown in Figure 4. 
The above structure can be extended by expanding the sub-claims 
to further sub-claims, with the arguments justifying that the 
decompositions into sub-claims are valid. The final nodes of the 
justification should always be supporting evidence. 
The motivation for an assurance case is to: 
• provide an assurance viewpoint - for efficient review; 
• provide a focus and rationale for assurance activities - leading 
to efficient analysis and evaluation; 
• provide a reviewable approach - so that all stakeholders can be 
involved; 
• demonstrate the discharge of duty to public and shareholders; 
• allow interworking between standards and innovation. 
There is considerable standardisation work on structured cases and 
Claims Argument Evidence and activities internationally in a 
number of sectors. Of particular relevance is the ISO/IEC standard 
that provides a definition of the CAE concept [21]. 
 
Figure 4: Example of CAE structure in an assurance case 
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